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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHEWRON OIL COIIIPANY, doing 
business as STANDARD OIL 
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
--vs. -
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
HYRUM L. LEE, EUGENE H. 
MAYER, HOW ARD .J. PRYOR, 
coustitnting the Board of Commis-
sioners of Beaver Ccnmty, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 11,317 
APP·ELLANT'S BRIEF 
srrATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to obtain a judgment declaring the 
zoning- resolution of Beaver County to be inYalid as ap-
plied to the plaintiff's property and to require the Coun-
ty Commissioners to issue to the plaintiff a building per-
mit to construct aud operate a service station on its 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lo\ver court held the zoning resolution to be 
rnlid and dismissed the action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and a judicial determination that the zon-
ing ordinance is invalid as applied to the plaintiff's 
property, also a mandatory injunction requiring the de-
fendants to issue to plaintiff a permit authorizing it to 
construct and operate a service station on its property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, enacted in 
May, 1959, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17-29-9, 
U.C.A. 1953, classifies the unincorporated area of the 
county into nine separate zones or use districts (Ex. 1). 
Most of this area is public domain and state-owned land 
(Ex. 1). No master plan was en~r designed or adopted 
either by the Board of Commissioners or the Planning 
Commission and no surYey or study of the physical, so-
cial or economic conditions within the area was evrr 
made, so far as the records disclose ( R. 16). 'rhe only 
plan for zoning the territory is incorporated in the reso-
lution itself (R. 12 and 16). The only map which appears 
to have any connection with the resolution is designated 
as "Zone Map of Beaver County, Utah" and is physi-
cally attached to Exhibit 1 (R. 17). It is not signed or 
attested or otherwise authenticated, but apparently was 
adopted by designation (p. 27, Ex. 1). 
The resolution provides detailed and exhaustive 
regulations controlling the use of the property and the 
location of buildings and other structures. The general 
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objectives and characteristics of each zone are specifically 
<lesigna ted (Ex. 1). 
Only two of the zones provided for in the ordinance 
are of particular concern in this litigation. These are 
the G-I Grazing Zone (p. 36, Ex. 1) and the H-I Highway 
Serviee Zone ( p. 43, Ex. 1). The primary use proscribed 
in the Grazing Zone is the raising of livestock. Any use 
which would "thwart or militate" against the raising of 
linstock is expressly prohibited. This zone is to be char-
acterized by large tracts of open range land ( p. 36, Ex. 1). 
The primary use established by the Highway Service 
Zone is ''for commercial and service uses to serve the 
traveling public." It is to be located along interstate 
higlnrnys, several miles from already-established commu-
11ities, where service facilities are required to meet the 
needs of the traveling public. It is characterized by rest-
ful surroundings and off-street parking space where the 
traveling public may find rest, comfort and necessary 
serYices. Representative of the uses within this zone are 
automobile filling stations, public garages, cafes, trailer 
courts, motels and caretaker dwellings. The objectives 
of this zone are to promote safety on the highway and 
connnience to the traveling public. None of the unin-
corporated territory was zoned as H-I Highway Service 
property (Ex. 1). 
Plaintiff's property is classifird under the ordinance 
as Grazing Zone property. It consists of a vacant plot 
450 fert by 500 feet fronting on Interstate Highway I-15, 
at the Pine Creek Hill Interchange, 21 miles north of the 
Town of Beaver (Ex. 10). It is oriented to the inter-
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state freeway in such maimer that a south-hound Yehicle 
can leave the freeway from the outside lane, detour a 
short distance to the property and then re-enter the free-
way, merging into the south-bound traffic (Ex. 10). No 
other property in the county, except that of the compan-
ion plaintiffs, has such access to the interstate freeway 
(Tr. 17-18). In addition, it presents an excellent view to 
motorists for se,-eral miles. It is an ideal location for a 
service station and has a Yery substantial valuP for that 
purpose (Tr. 367). 
The Phillips Petroleum Company and Desc•ret In-
vestors Group own laud adjoining the plaintiff's prop-
erty. They brought an action to obtaiu the same relief 
as that sought by the plaintiff and the two cases were con-
solidated for trial. 
The zoning resolution provides for the creatiou of 
a Board of Adjustment and defhws its jurisdiction and 
functions (Ex. 1). No such Board has h0en appointed. 
Plaintiff petitioned the Board of County Commis-
sioners to rezone its property by classifyiug it as High-
way Service Zone property. The Board rPferred the pe-
tition to the Planning Commission, which held a public 
hearing at which the plaintiff and its companion plaintiffs 
appeared and presented evidence iu support of the peti-
tions. The Planning Commission recommended that the 
petitions be denied (Ex. 17). It based its recommenda-
tion upon the grounds that plaiutiff's proposed opera-
tions on their property would require an additional cost 
to the county in providing police and fire protection 
and other governmental services, and that a commercial 
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development at Pine Creek Hill would seriously endanger 
the economic stability of existing communities, particu-
larly Beaver City, thereby menacing the tax base. As a 
final prop, it was stated that plaintiff's project was un-
11ceessary since the services it proposed to offer could be 
made available in or near existing communities (Ex. 17). 
In answer to interrogatories, the defendants defend-
ed the ordinance upon essentially the same grom1d as 
that relied upon by the Planning Commission. 
'11 lic unincorporated area of Beaver County embraces 
approximately 1,665,680 acres, most of which is either 
mountains or desert (Tr. 336-7). There are about 200 
farms scattered throughout the area (Tr. 343). Except 
for these farms, the territory is either public domain or 
state-owned land (Ex. 1 and R. 45-48). The population 
of the county according to the latest census is 4,235; 
1,653 of these inhabitants reside in the Town of Beaver, 
1,556 in the Town of Milford and about 550 in the Town 
of ?\Iincrsville (Pre-trial Order). The three towns men-
tioned are incorporated and have not enacted any zon-
ing ordinances. There are no commercial enterprises of 
any kind in the unincorporated area of the county except 
a small, recently-built service station which is located 
just outside the city limits of Beaver. 
After allowing the case to be dormant for nearly a 
year &nd a half, the trial court made and entered its judg-
ment entitled "Memorandum Decision,'' adjudging the 
ordinance to be valid and dismissing the action. No 
findings of fact were made or entered and no opinion was 
rendered. 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POIN'r I 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER 
COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S PROPERTY BY PREVENTING ANY 
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF, AND VIO-
LATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
POINT II 
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBI-
TRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRIMINA-
TORY AND VOID AS APPLIED TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY. 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS FOR H-I HIGHWAY 
SERVICE ZONE IS A LEGISLATIVE DE-
TERMINATION THAT THE PUBLIC WEL-
FARE REQUIRED FREEWAY-ORIENTED 
PROPERTY TO BE CLASSIFIED IN THAT 
ZONE. 
POINT IV 
THEJUDGMENTISNOTSUPPORTEDBY 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS A NULLITY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER 
COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAIN-
TIF'F 'S PROPERTY BY PREVENTING ANY 
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF, AND VIO-
LATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 
L.Ed. 842; Arverne Bay, etc. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587; 
Tews v. Woolhiser, 185 N.E.827; Dawsey v. Kensington, 
177 N.E.427; Stevens v. Ifontingto1i, 229 N.E.2d 591; Erv-
in v. Ann Arbor, 34 N.W.2d 11; Prentice v. American Uni-
versity, 214 F.2d 282; Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper, 225 N.W. 
371; Rowla1Y1d v. Racine, 271 N.W.36; Dorsey, etc., v. 
Davis, 180 Atl. 396; Naylor v. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114; 
8undlim v. Zonin,g Board, 145 Atl.451; Rosenthal v. Bed-
ford, 134 N.E.2d 727; Roselle v. Livingston, 122 A.2d 506; 
Vernon Park Realty v. M aunt Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517; 
Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767; Trust Co. v. Chicago, 
96 N.E.2d 499; Loesh v. Newburg, etc., 100 N.E.2d 543; 
Eaton v. Sweeney, 177 N.E. 412. 
The controlling question to be decided on this appeal 
is whether the provisions of the zoning ordinance re-
stricting the plaintiff's property to grazing purposes and 
prohihiting any use which would "thwart or militate" 
against that purpose deprives the plaintiff of its prop-
erty without due process of law, contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and/or 
Rection 7, Article I of our State Constitution. Through-
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out the entire proceedings before the County Commi:s-
sio11ers, the Planning Commission and the trial court, 
plaintiff contended that the answer to this que:stion must 
be in the affirmative. Appella11t now renews this con-
tention. 
Section 17-21-1, U.C.A., HJ53, provides that Boards of 
County Commissioners are empowered to provide for 
the physical development of the unincorporated territory 
within the county and for the zoning of all or any part 
thereof in the manner provided in Chapter 27. The de-
cisions of this Court have placed definite limitations upon 
the powers granted by this statutP. f-lec Gibbous and 
Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 
431 P.2d 5;":J9; Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 
141 P.2d 704; Dowse v. Salt Lake City, 123 {;tali 107, 255 
P.2d 723; Gayland v. Salt Lake Ccnrnty, 11 Fi ah 2c1 :io7, 
358 P.2d 3G8. The Supreme Conri of the United States 
has also definitely limited this zoning power. See N ecfou: 
v. Cambridge, 277 U.S .183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed 842; 
Seattle etc. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 
210. The limitation applicable to the ca:se at bar and 
\\'hich the above authorities establish is that a zoning re-
striction which deprives a property owner of substan-
tially all economic or profitable use of his property can-
not be sustained. Such a restriction amounts to confis-
cation and deprives the ow11er of his property without 
due process of law. 
That the ordinance renders the plaintiff's property 
worthless is beyond controversy. In it:s present status, 
it is less than worthless because it is lrnnkned h~, taxa-
tion and cannot he made to produce any income or profit 
whatever. It must remain idle until freed from the in-
junction issued by the zoning ordinance. 
It is of no significance that the property has never 
been used except for grazing purposes. The establish-
ment of the interstate freeway has completely changed 
its character. It has automatically become unsuited to 
grazing purposes and peculiarly adapted to commercial 
use. Its value has increased severalfold. 
Physical conditions and circumstances make plain-
tiff's property unique. It is oriented to the freeway in a 
\Hl)' \\·hich enables the motorist to leave that thorough-
fare from the outer lam·, stop for motoring needs and 
senices, re-enter the freeway and merge into the traffic 
moving in the same direction. No other property in the 
County has such attributes except the adjoining prop-
erty of the associated plaintiffs. It also abuts on the 
planned Milford Highway. There is no comparable com-
mercial site for several miles north of Pine Creek Hill 
or East on I-70. 'rhis combination of construction and 
natural conditions make the plaintiff's property pecu-
liarly adapted to serve the freeway motoring public. 
It is clear that the present case involves a factual 
situation not heretofore considered by this Court in any 
of the zoning cases that have been decided. Other courts 
have repeatedly been confronted ~with analogous facts 
and circumstances and have uniformly held that a zon-
i11g restriction \Vhich deprives an owner of all profitable 
or economic use of his property, as this ordinance does, 
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is confiscatory and violates property rights guaranteed 
by our State and Federal Constitutions. 
Arnerue Bay, etc. v. Thatcher, supra, is an rxreption-
ally well-reasoned case aud has become a leadiug au-
thority upon the constitutioual limitatious 011 zoning 
power. The facts involved are exactly aualogous to those 
presented by the present appeal. Until 1928, the Afferne 
Bay property was zoned "unrestricted." By amendment 
of the ordinance in that year the property was rezoned 
"residential." It was vacant and ullimproved, and for-
merly had been farming land. The reRideutial zone in 
which it was located abutted upon a street for a distaucc 
of four miles and the area was undevrloped rxcept for a 
few old farm buildings. Only thrre of these were located 
on the abutting street within a distauce of a mile. One 
of them was used as a cow stable aud the other as a dairy 
office. In the vicinity of the plaintiff\; property the 
city had established an iuciuerator which gaYe off offen-
sive fumes and odors, and within a few hundred feet a 
sewer emptied into an open creek. This facility also 
gave off nauseating odors which permeated the plaintiff's 
premises. There had been no homes constructed in the 
district since the amendment of the ordinance and the 
prospect of the district becoming a residential area in 
the foreseeable future was quite dim. 
Traffic on the abutting highway had greatly increased 
and plaintiff's property became a highly desirable loca-
tion for a service station and could be used very profit-
ably for that purpose. It was evident that if the prop-
eriy could not be devoted to such use, it would remain 
idle indefinitely. 
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The plaintiff petitioned the Board of Adjustment 
for a variance to permit the use of the property for a 
service station. The petition was denied. The plaintiff 
appealed first to the intermediate and then to the high-
est court of appeals. Both courts sustained the decision 
of the Board. See 247 App. Div. 889, 286 N.Y.S. 785, 3 
N.E.2d 457. The plaintiff then brought suit in the Dis-
trict Court to have the ordinance adjudged to be null and 
void as to the plaintiff's property, upon the ground that 
it Yiolated both the Constitutions of the State of New 
York and of the United States. The relief prayed for 
was granted and the contention of the defendant that the 
matter was res adjudicata was overruled. 
The res adjudicata plea was disposed of by the prop-
osition that the conditions which rendered the property 
u11suitable for residential purposes were not peculiar to 
the plaintiff's property and, therefore, the Board of Ad-
justment did not abuse its discretion. This determina-
tion did not foreclose plaintiff's contention that the ordi-
nance deprived it of its property without due process of 
la\\r. Upon this point, the Court held: 
"If the state or the city, acting by delegation from 
the state, had plenary power to pass laws calcu-
lated to promote the general welfare, then the 
validity of the ordinance might be sustained; for 
'we have nothing to do with the question of the 
wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances.' 
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 393, 47 S.St. 114, 120, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 
A.L.R. 1016. The legislative power of the state is, 
however, not plenary, but is limited by the Consti-
tution of the United States and by the Constitu-
tion of the state. It may not take private prop-
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erty without compensation e\·en for a public pur-
pose and to adnrnce the gPneral welfare. Eaton v. 
Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.J<J. 412. 'The protec-
tion of private propNty in the Fifth Amendment 
presupposes that it is wauted for public use, hut 
provides that it shall not lw taken for such use 
without compensation. A similar assumption is 
made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & -Western R. 
Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28 S.Ct. 331, 52 L.Ed. 637, 
13 Ann.Cas. 1008. ·when this seemingly absolute 
protection is found to he qualified by the police 
power, 'the natural tendency of human nature is 
to extend the qualification more and more until at 
last private property disappears. But that can-
not he accomplished in this way under the Consti-
tution of the United States.' " 
The principle established by the cit<•d case rn that 
economic evolution alters the adaptability of property to 
a particular use and that a municipality cannot constitu-
tionally freeze property to a use to which it is not suited. 
This is precisely what Beaver County has effected hy the 
present zoning resolution. 
Tews v. Woolhiser, 185 N.E. 827, is another case in 
which highway construction has altered the use to which 
property is adapted and thereby rendering void a zoning 
ordinance which forever condemned the property to an 
uneconomic and unprofitable use. rrhe property was lo-
cated in Block A of a subdivision which was zoned for 
residential purposes. Due to challf.,ring circumstances, 
Block A had become unsuited for residential purposes. 
One of these circumstances was the widening of the street 
on which the plaintiff's property abutted. A great in-
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crease in traffic resulted from this street improvement 
and plaintiff's property became a very desirable location 
for a senice station. The evidence showed that for resi-
dential use plaintiff's property was worth $100, but for 
scnicc station purposes, it was worth $33,000. Plain-
tiff sought to have the ordinance amended to permit the 
construction of a service station on its property. The 
application was denied. It then brought suit to have the 
ordinance declared invalid upon the ground that it vio-
lated hoth the state and federal Constitutions. The trial 
court granted the relief prayed for and the municipality 
amwalecl to the Supreme Court of Illinois. That Court 
said that the question to be determined was, "Can an 
ordinance be sustained as a Yalid exercise of the police 
power which zones property to a use to which it cannot 
be put and thereby renders it useless and valueless for 
au~' purpose while so zoned~'' The question was an-
swered thus : 
" ( 4-G) It must not be overlooked that zoning 
which courts can approve must have as its basic 
purpose the setting aside of areas of property for 
specific uses. Zoning which admittedly limits 
property to a use which cannot reasonably be 
made of it cannot be said to set aside such prop-
erty to a use but constitutes the taking of such 
property without just compensation. Use of prop-
erty is an element of o\vnership therein. Regard-
les~ of the opinion of zealots that property may 
properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without 
compensation, such principle finds no support in 
the genius of our government nor in the principles 
of jristice as we know them. Such a d?ctrine shocks 
the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that 
property remain open and unused, then certainly 
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the public, and not private individuals, should 
bear the cost of reasonabk• compe11sation for such 
property under the rules of law governing the con-
demnation of private property for public use. It 
lies not within the power of a municipality to so 
zone property as to render it worthless. Such is 
not zoning - it is confiscation." 
The case of Vern.on Park, etc. v. Mount Vernon, 121 
N.E. 2d 517, is also undistinguishable from the case at 
bar. The property involved in this case was an eighty-six 
thousand square foot tract known as the Plaza. It ad-
joined a railroad station and was surrounded by businesH 
property. In 1922 it was zoned for business and in 1927 
was rezoned residential. Plaintiff bought the property 
in 1951, knowing that it was zoned rcside11tial. He ap-
plied for a variance to permit the construction of a shop-
ping center and when this application was denied, 
brought suit to compel the town to rezone the property. 
·while this suit was pending, the tow11 rezoned the prop-
erty to restrict its use to the parking of automobiles. The 
plaintiff then amended his complaint, claiming that the 
ordinance confiscated his property and was unconstitu-
tional and void. 
The property had always been used for parking auto-
mobiles except a small area upon which a service station 
was located. The value of the property as a shopping 
center was several hundred thousand dollars, while its 
value for parking was only a fraction thereof. It had 
no value for residential purposf>s. The municipality 
contended that the use of the property for a shopping 
center would create a traffic congestion to an intolerable 
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extent and that the public welfare demanded the restric-
tion. The Court disposed of this contention as follows: 
''However compelling and acute the community 
traffic problem may be, its solution does not li~ 
in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on 
the individual owner of a single parcel of land in 
the guise of regulation, even for a public purpose. 
True it is that for a long time the land has been 
devoted to parking, a nonconforming use, but it 
does not follow that an ordinance prohibiting any 
other use is a reasonable exercise of the police 
power. While the common counsel has the un-
questioned right to enact zoning laws respecting 
the use of property in accordance with a well-con-
sidered and comprehensive plan designed to pro-
mote public health, safety and general welfare, 
General City Law, Consol. Laws, c. 21, §83, such 
power is subject to the constitutional limitation 
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreason-
ably, Nash ville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 
U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949; Brous v. 
Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E. 2d 503, and this is 
so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the 
use of the property for any purpose for which it 
is reasonably adapted. Arverne Bay Construction 
Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587, 117 
A.L.R. 1110. By the same token, an ordinance 
valid when adopted \Vill nevertheless be stricken 
down as invalid when, at a later time, its opera-
tion under changed conditions proves confiscatory, 
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 51 S.Ct. 
252, 75 L.Ed. 690, such for instance, as when the 
greater part of its value is destroyed, Dowsey v. 
Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 211, 177 N.E. 427, 
86 A.L.R. 642, for which the courts will afford re-
lief in an appropriate case. Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 
N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412." 
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In Loesh v. Newburg Heights, 100 N.E.2d 5543, the 
plaintiff owned a tract of land in the village of Newburg 
Heights consisting of 46 acres which had never been im-
proved or developed in any way. Part of it had been 
used as a public dump, and it was divided by a large 
ravine through which a creek carried sewage. A large 
industry was established on some adjoining property, and 
the area generally was industrial in character. Under 
the zoning ordinance, part of plaintiff's property was 
zoned residential and the rest of it commercial. Plain-
tiff petitioned the zoning board to rezone its property 
industrial but the board declined to do so. 'l'he property 
was totally unsuited for either eommercial or residential 
use but had a very substantial value for industrial pur-
poses. The Court held that the zoning ordinance did not 
promote the public health, safety or puhlic welfare and 
therefore violated the constitutional rights of the owner. 
"The ordinance in question does not promote the 
public health, safety or welfare of the community 
by requiring lands in the midst of a heavy indus-
trial area, lacking pavement and utilities, in part 
used as a public dump and elsewhere traversed by 
a creek into which raw sewage is emptied, to be 
used for residential or commercial purposes. This 
ordinance passes the bounds of reason and as-
sumes the character of merely an arbitrary fiat." 
Defendants argued in the lower court that plaintiff 
was precluded from asserting that the ordinance corifis-
cated its property since it acquired the property after 
the ordinance was passed. This Court repudiated tlmt 
argument while the present case was under advisement. 
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In Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 19 
Utah 2<l 329, 431 P.2d 559, it was held: 
"Defendant seems disturbed over the fact that 
plaintiffs acquired the parcel after the 1957 ordi-
nance went into effect. We are not sympathetic 
to that position since use, not ownership, of the 
land is the concern of the zoning authorities.'' 
Other courts have consistently refused to accept 
defendants' contention. See America1i National Bank, 
etc. v. Chicago, 195 N.E.2nd 627; Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 
N.E. 767; National Brick Company v. The Courity of 
Lake, 137 N.E.2d 494; Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 
513; Vernon Park, etc. v. Mount Vernon, 121N.E.2d517. 
A somewhat similar argument was made based on the 
fact that plaintiff's property had at one time been part of 
a large tract which was adapted to grazing use. Defend-
ants then say that this voluntary severance destroyed the 
utility of the property for grazing and that plaintiff is 
precluded from asserting that the ordinance confiscates 
the property. The blind spot in this position is that there 
is no connection between the severances and the newly 
created appurtenance. The subdivision of the property 
occurred after the freeway was established and the new 
use created. It is immaterial that the old use has become 
valueless. 
The case at bar is a clearer case of confiscation than 
any of those ab-0ve cited. The construction of the inter-
state freeway completely altered the plaintiff's property 
so far as its utility is concerned by creating a new and 
<listinet appurtenance. It converted the property into a 
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valuable business site. The ordinance destroys this new-
ly created attribute and is a direct \·iolation of both State 
and Federal Constitutions. 
POINT II. 
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBI-
TRARY, UNREASON ABLE, DIS CRIMIN A-
TORY AND VOID AS APPLIED 'l'O THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY. 
Gibbons and Reed v. North Salt Lake, 19 Utah 2d 
329, 431P.2d559; Long v. Highland Park, 45 N.E.2d 10; 
People r. Skokie, 97 N.E.2d 310; People v. Kirby, 2 N.E.2d 
842; Midland, etc. v. Knox Cnunty, 115 N.E.2d 275; Lieu-
ling v. Deerfield, 171 N.E.2d 58:-i; F'orbes v. Hubbard, 180 
N.E. 767; Glen Rock Realty v. Board of Adj11stme11t, 192 
A.2d 865; Vernon Park, etc. r. Mt. Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 
517; Richardson v. Warzcick, 221 A.2d 460; Hrnle v. 
Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355; Elizabeth v. Waterford, 26 
N.W.2d 788; LaSalle, etc. v. Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609. 
Even if freezing the propert)- to grazing uses did not 
amount to confiscation, the ordina11ce is nevPrtheless arbi-
trary, unreasonable and discriminatory as applied to the 
plaintiff. It is an abuse of the police power conf0rred 
upon the county to zone property. 
In Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2(1 ~300, 410 P.2d 
764, this Court declared: 
''The foundational reason for zoning is to regu-
late the growth and development of the city in an 
orderly manner. Among the objectives to he 
served is to avoid mixiug together of industrial, 
commercial, business a1Hl residential use8; the 
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prevention of undue concentrations of people in 
certain areas under undesirable conditions· mak-
ing provision for safe and efficient transportation; 
for recreational needs; and for the enhancement 
of aesthetic values, all in order to best serve the 
purpose of promotiug the health, safety, morals 
and g-eneral welfare of the city and its inhabi-
tants." 
'l'hese objectives of zoning must be kept in mind in 
determining whether the ordinance is reasonable, arbi-
trary or discriminatory. The physical characteristics of 
the area are also of controlling importance. They negate 
the reasonableness of the present ordinanee as applied 
to plaintiff's property. Instead of providing for the 
physical development of the unincorporated area of Bea-
\·er County, the ordinance blockades that development 
by preventing the plaintiff from establishing a business 
<'nterprise which will generate a very substantial amount 
of both direct and indirect tax revenue and provide much 
needed employment in a territory where the tax base has 
lieen static for many years and employment deteriorating. 
Iu addition to these contributions to physical devel-
opment of the area and the public welfare, plaintiff's 
project at Pine Creek Hill will facilitate interstate com-
merce and the use of the freeway generally by providing 
easily accessible products and services. All of these pub-
lic benefits are to be had without cost and without creat-
ing damage, injury, harm or evil consequence. 
It would he difficult to find a region less amenable 
to zoning than the unincorporated area of Beaver County. 
There is practically nothing in this territory upon which 
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the legitimate objectives of such legiHlation can operate. 
There are no industrial, commel'cial or business estab-
lishments and, therefore, nothing to he separated, segre-
gated or regulated. No such projeets are even on the 
horizon, so far as can now he seen. \Vith only a few lnm-
drecl people scattC'recl over a \·ast desert area, there is 
no need to be alarmed about undue concC'ntration of peo-
ple under undesirable conditions. There is not even a 
suggestion from any source that plaintiff's operations at 
Pine Creek Hill would militate against Hafc and efficie11t 
transportation. 
Admittedly, the area contains re>creational facilities 
and aesthetic values. These could not be either damaged, 
promoted or preserved by restricting the plaintiff's prop-
erty to grazing purposes. Permitting its use fol' a roa<l-
side service station would injun' nobody or damage any 
property. 
The only justification for restricting the lawful use 
of land is that public welfare requires it. Without this 
foundation, the restrictive enactment is u11reasollahle and 
void. 
"The goYernmental power to iHtc>rfere hy zoning 
regulation'l with the general rights of the land-
owner by restricting the character of his use is not 
unlimited and other questiolls aside such restric-
tion cannot be impose1l if it does not hear a sub-
stantial relation to the public health, t·mfety, mor-
als, or general welfare." Ner·tow v. Camuridgr, 
278 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. .J-47, 7~ L.Ed. 842. 
Furthermore, the ordinance must pl'omot<' the public wd-
fare in a realistic and substantial <kgT0e aml if the gain 
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to the public is small compared with the hardship im-
posed on the property 0Wl1er, the exercise of the police 
power is arbitrary and unreasonable. In Liebling v. 
Deerfield, supra, it is said: 
"It has long been established that zoning classi-
fications must bear some real and substantial re-
lationship to the public welfare, health or safety; 
and where the gain to the public is small as com-
pared to the hanlship imposed upon the owner, no 
valid basis for the exercise of the police power 
exists. Atkins v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. 2d 287, 
163 N.E. 2d 826; LaSalle National Bank v. County 
of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E. 2d 65." 
In Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, the Court said: 
"If the ordinance <liscloses no purpose to prevent 
some public evil or to fill some public need and 
has no real or substantial relation to public health, 
morals and safety, it must be held void." 
'l'he Supreme Court of Utah has declared: 
''The right to regulate the use of property with-
in municipal limits is limited for the purpose of 
promoting the health, safety, morals and the gen-
eral welfare of the community ... Thus, after 
considering all the factors involved, including the 
existing use of the property, the availability of a 
natural resource, the severe loss to both the fee 
owners and the public as compared to the rela-
tively small inconvenience to owners in that neigh-
borhood, we conclude that there is evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's decision that 
the zoning ordiuance as enforced against the 
plaintiff's' property is an invalid exercise of the 
police power.'' Gibbons and Reed Company v. 
North Salt Lake City, supra. 
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In the lower court the plaintiff, by written interrog-
atories, required the defendants to point out wherein 
the restriction 011 the plaintiff';,; property imposell h)- thP 
zoning resolution would promote the public welfare, or 
wherein the use of the property for sen-ice station pur-
poses would be harmful or injurious to anyone. The an-
swers were that they had employed a professional plan-
ning consultant to assist and advise the Cou11ty Plan-
ning Commission and the Board of County Commission-
ers, and that the Board was informed (obviously by this 
consultant) and they bcliewd that the use of the plain-
tiff's property for service station purposes would divide 
the existing and anticipated expansio11 of the "near fu-
ture commercial complex'' in the county to such an ex-
tent that it would be deprind of the advantages of urban-
ization, and "the entire commercial complex" would 
deteriorate, commercial development would be disas-
trously scattered, the tax base of the cou11ty would be 
damaged, and community life would deteriorate, also that 
the cost of governmental sen·iees would increase. De-
fendants were further adYised and believed that publir 
necessity did not require the commercial development of 
plaintiff's property since existing facilities and space for 
additional facilities are so near to the plaintiff's prop-
erty. This same alleged justification for freezing plain-
tiff's property to grazing use was given by the Planning 
Commission. 
The "near future commercial complex" referred to 
hy the Board is the influx of tourists and increase of traf-
fic generated by the interstate freeway whieh will Pxtend 
across the United States when the eonnection of I-70 at 
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Cove Fort is completed. No other commercial activity 
appears on the horizon or has been mentioned by any of 
the defendants. The zoning ordinance was, according 
to the Board, designed and enacted to prevent the frag-
mentization of this freeway-oriented business and to con-
centrate it into established communities. The only estab-
lished community to which this business could be directed 
is the To-vvn of Beaver. In other words, the ordinance 
was enacted to eliminate competitors for the freeway-
generated business and to give the establishments in the 
town a monopoly of this considerable enterprise. Both 
.J. Frank Smith, the Chairman of the Board, and Dale 
Despain, the architect and designer of the ordinance, 
testified positively to these purposes and objectives. 
This is a clear case of abuse of the zoning power. 
The authorities, without conflict, hold that zoning 
authority is not a vehicle for regulating competition or 
creating monopolies and that municipalities have no 
proper concern with economic laws of supply and de-
mand or who may or may not engage in a lawful business. 
In Henle v. City of Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355, it is held: 
''Zoning ordinances cannot be concerned with 
questions of economic rules of supply and demand. 
Such an issue has no place in this kind of action. 
~oning ordinances are not the media through 
which restrictions may be placed on who may 
engage in legitimate enterprise." 
Again, in Richardson v. TV arwick, 221 A.2d 460, the 
Court said: 
"\Ve pointed out there and we reiterate now that 
zoning lehrislation was never intended as a means 
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of controlling competition in an area. Comrwtent 
evidence of the existenc·e of a 11eed or a demand 
for a proposed nse is alwa rn c1emonstrativ0 that 
the zoning board's grant is. in the public i11terest. 
:b~vidence, however, that there ar0 existing facili-
ties which would render the same s01Tice as tlw 
proposed use is not com1wtent unless it can be 
shown that to allow the proposed use would result 
in conditions that would be inimirnl to the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare. Among such 
conditions would be traffic congestion, deprecia-
tion of surrounding property and other deleter-
ious factors.'' 
In Glen Rock Realty Co111pa11y v. Board uf Adjust-
ment, 192 A.2d 865, the Zoning Board attempted to jus-
tify an ordinance \Yhich zoned property suitable only for 
commercial purposes as residential property upon the 
ground that a commercial use of plaintiff's property 
would '' fragmentize our central business clistriet with-
out adding materially to the convenience of our citizens." 
The Board specifically decryed "the disbursal of buying 
power into peripheral areas.'' The Court repudiated the 
attempt to justify the ordinance upon any such ground. 
Other cases to the same effect are: Rx Partc TVliite, 
234 Pac. 39G; TVickham v. Brc-ker, 274 Pac. 397; Ju re 
Licb's Appeal, 116 A.2cl 860; Roseutltal v. Bedford, 1:3-± 
N.E.2d 737; In re N.E. Corner, etc., 186 N".E.2d 515. 
Whether plaintiff's operntio11s at Pim' Creek Hill 
coukl adversely affect property values in the Town of 
Beaver is a matter of pure speculation. It is not possible 
for plaintiff to intercept any northhoun<l traffic as it has 
already passed the Town of Bea vcr and furth0r the prop-
erty is not oriented to that traffic. According- to stncli<'::: 
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made and experience m other areas, freeway motorists 
are very reluctant to leave the freeway for motor sup-
plies or services. They will stay on the freeway until 
they reach roadside service facilities ('l'r. 285). These 
are loeated only at intervals such as Pine Creek Hill and 
large terminal cities or towns. As applied to the present 
situation, freeway motorists will bypass the Town of 
BcaYer and obtain their supplies and services at Cedar 
City, thus rendering the present ordinance for the most 
part ineffective to concentrate the business in the Town 
of Beaver (Tr. 285). If as the defendants fear, "the 
near future commercial complex'' will be scattered and 
fragrrn~11tized, it will be brought about by the freeway, 
ancl not by operations at Pine Creek Hill. 
The contention of the Board that plaintiff's proposed 
<levelopment would increase governmental costs is not in 
areorcl with the facts. The county does not furnish any 
!teat, light, power, sewer, sanitation, water communi-
rat ion or transportation service of any kind. It does not 
l'\'C'll have any fire prevention facilities. Plaintiff's op-
eration would require no inspection, supervision or police 
protection, since it is loeated in the open desert more than 
twenty miles from any habitation or business establish-
ment. The only government cost that would be in-
volYed is the cost of assessing the property for taxation 
purposes. 
The contention that the needs of the freeway motor-
isb; can he supplied from establishments in the Town of 
Bean•r and in the small commercial area adjoining the 
town is likewise without factual foundation. None of 
such establishments have the freeway access available at 
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Pine Creek Hill. Furthermore, the Board has no lawful 
authority to regulate business convenience and necessity. 
Defendants concede that a service station at Pine Creek 
Hill would be a great convenience to freeway motorists 
and would definitely facilitate both intra and interstate 
commerce. 
No one can deny that the proposed installations at 
Pine Creek Hill would be a definite commercial asset to 
the county. They will increase both direct and indirect 
tax revenue and provide employment which will support 
several families. All of these benefits are to be had with 
practically no cost to the government. They will greatly 
increase after the opening of I-70. 
There is uo evidence whateYer to indicate that the 
plaintiff's proposed project would endanger the public 
health, safety, transportation, peace, happiness, morals 
or well-being of the community or any other part of the 
public. It could not conceivably affect adversely land 
values or aesthetic qualities of any of the surrounding 
area. In these circumstances the question, whether the 
use of the plaintiff's property for commercial purposes is 
detrimental to the public welfare, is a matter about which 
reasonable minds cannot differ. 
The public welfare is not confined to business inter-
ests in the Town of Beaver. It embraces all present an<l 
future inhabitants of the area including, what is impor-
tant in this case, the stranger at the gate. 
The certain and very considerable public benefits to 
be had from plaintiff's proposed i1westments and opera-
tions rn far outweigh the insignificant and remotely prob-
27 
able detriment to a lirnite(l group of property owners as 
t oleave no justification whatever for freezing plaintiff's 
property to a use which is less than worthless. 
Defendants may argue that the determination of the 
zoning authorities that the restriction upon the use of 
plaintiff's property is necessary to promote the public 
welfare', is conclusive and not subject to review by the 
Court. Such cannot be the law. If it were, there would 
he no limitation upon the zoning power and it would be 
futile to contend that any zoning restriction is unreason-
able or illegal. 
·whether the zoning restriction imposed upon the 
plaintiff's property enhances the public welfare presents 
a question of law which can be determined authoritatively 
only by this Court. The principle is clearly stated in 
Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513: 
"(2) In Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 
676, 1 So.2d 642, 646, we held that 'In each case 
where an attack is made upon the validity of a 
zoning ordinance, insofar as its provisions apply 
to limit and restrict the litigants' property, as in 
the case at bar, a mixed question of law and fact 
is presented.' 
'' ( 3) The Chancellor heard all of the testimony 
with reference to the nature of the property in-
volved, its size, its location, a description of the 
surrounding community and the uses other than 
as a hospital to which the property might be put. 
After the presentation of all the evidence of this 
nature the decision as to whether the restrictions 
were r~asonable or unreasonable was a conclusion 
of law to be determined by the Court from the 
facts presented." 
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See also State v. Bedford. 134 N.E. 2d 726; People, 
cte. v. City of Rockford, 2 N.K2cl 842. 
POINT III. 
THE PROVISIONS FOR H-I IIIGHW AY 
SERVICE ZONE IS A LEGISLATIVFJ DE-
TERMINATION THAT THJiJ PUBLIC WEL-
FARE REQUIRED FHFJEWAY-ORIENTED 
PROPERTY TO BE CLASSIFIED JN 'rHAT 
ZONE. 
Ex Parle ffhifl', 234 Pac. 396; Wickham v. Becker, 
274 Pac. 397. 
It has already been noted that no comprehensin 
plan for zoning the uniucorpornted area of Beaver Coun-
ty was ever adopted or approved hy either the Planning 
Commission or the Board of Commissioners, and that 
the onl~r plan for the zoning of this territory is that whieli 
has been incorporated in the zcming resolution itself. 
"\Vhen plaintiffs inquired by written intPrrogatories why 
no property along the freewa~· had been classified into 
the Highway Service Zone, the answer was that then• "·as 
no present necessity for such classification, but that such 
necessity was anticipated to oecur at some future date 
and the Board desired to be in a position to make the 
classification without amending thP resolution. If there 
were any doubt that the JH"O\·isions of the resolution 
creating the Highway Servif'e Zo11e is a legislative deter-
mination that the public welfare n•quirC's that some prop-
erty along thl' freC'way hC' classifil'd as Highway Zone 
property, the C'xpl:matiorn; gin'll h~- the Board i11 its an-
swers to interrogatories remon• it. 
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The explanation that the time had not arrived for 
Highway Service zoning is a sham and a smoke screen. 
Grazing zone<l property could not, of course, be rezoned 
Highway Service without amending the ordinance. The 
real reason for omitting any property from Highway 
Service Zone was to force freeway motorists into the 
Town of Beaver to obtain their needed accommodations 
and service. 
In the case of E.i: Parte TVhite, supra, the Supreme 
Court of California decided this exact point. The zoning 
or<liua11ce of the City of Atherton provided for two dis-
tricts, one of which was designated as an unrestricted dis-
trict ancl the other as a residential district. In the un-
restricted district, commercial structures of any lawful 
kind were allowed. No commercial structures \Yere al-
lo·wed in the residential district. The only property 
classified as unrestricted district property was a small 
area upon which a service station was constructed. The 
plaintiff constructed a real estate office on a lot located in 
the residential district. He was prosecuted for violating 
the zoning ordinance, and the Supreme Court of Califor-
uia helcl that the ordinance was invalid because the action 
of the Board in adopting the zoning resolution was a 
legislative determination that the public welfare required 
that appropriate parts of the city be classified as unre-
stricted property. vVe q note from the opinion as follows : 
"It appears in the instant case that the board of 
trustees undertook to zone the town into two dis-
tricts, one of which was devoted to residential uses 
and the other to business uses. This was in effect 
a legislative finding that the maintenance of both 
,.,uch districts was necessary to the public welfare. 
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It was the duty, therefore, of the board of trustees 
when zoning the town to make adequate provision 
for both such uses. That adequate provision for 
the business district was not made is at once ap-
parent. It is true that some provision was made 
for business; that is to say, 1-1/10 acres out of 
2,500 acres was designated as an 'unrestricted dis-
trict' in which buildings to be 'devoted to any law-
ful use' might be constructed. But it is apparent 
from the fact that the 'unrestricted district' was 
already fully occupied by a gasoline station and a 
restaurant to the exclusion of new business uses 
that the board of trustees was limiting the 'un-
restricted district' to lmsiness enterprises already 
established and to the exclusion of any future 
business development. The ordinance in effect 
grants a monopoly to the business establishments 
already situate in the 1-1/10 acres of the 'unre-
stricted district.' In other words, under the guise 
of regulating business and segregating it to a par-
ticular district, the ordinances in fact prohibits all 
business save and except that of the favored two 
already established.'' 
The case of TY ickham v. Becker, supra, is another 
well-considered case holding that the division of a city 
into different zones is a legislatiYe determination that 
public welfare requires that some property be classified 
under each of the zones in order to prevent discrimination 
and rendering the zoning ordinance i1wa1id. The City of 
Piedmont was divided into three zones by the zoning 
ordinance. Plaintiff's property was zoned residential 
and had been used for that purpose for a considerable 
period. Changed conditions in the city rendered her prop-
erty unsuited to residential purposes and made it very 
valuable for commercial purposes. Only two very small 
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areas were classified as business property and these were 
already in use for business purposes. The Court held 
that the effect of the zoning ordinance was to freeze exist-
ing uses and therefore create a monopoly. The zoning 
ordinance was held to be discriminatory and void. The 
decision was based upon Ex Parte White, sitpra, and the 
Court quoted from it. Continuing, the Court said: 
''The situation presented here, with respect to 
the creation of a business monopoly, is to all in-
tents and purposes the same as the one existing 
there. Here, too, the legislative body of the city 
adopted a zoning ordinance creating both residen-
tial and business districts, which, as there stated, 
was in effect a determination that both such dis-
tricts were necessary to the public welfare. Con-
sequently, as there held, it was the duty of the 
legislative body to make adequate provision for 
both such uses. This it failed to do; but, on the 
contrary, as was done in the Atherton case, the 
municipality limited the unrestricted district to 
business enterprises already established, to the 
practical exclusion of any further business devel-
opment.'' 
The professional planner who designed this ordi-
nance and sold it to the County Commissioners fully real-
ized that the only possible foundation upon which zoning 
this vast desert area could rest was the opening of the 
interstate freeway. He realized also that the public wel-
fare required that facilities to meet the needs of travelers 
on the freeway must be established. His zoning plan 
prO\'ided for these facilities. The Board adopted it and 
then nullified it by failing to classify the property ac-
cording to the plan. 
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POINT IV. 
THF~ JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTI~D BY 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND rn A NULLITY. 
Gaddis Inresfmeut Cnmpauy v. Knight, :1 Utah 2d 43, 
278 P.2d 284; Joh11so11 Cnrpnratinn v. Peterson, 18 Utah 
2d 260, 420 P.2d 615. 
Rule 52 of the Rules of CiYil Procedure requires thr 
Court to find the facts specially and state separately it8 
conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury. The Conrt made no finding of fact 
on any issue. 
Rule 52 is in effoct a mandate to th0 trial court to 
make a specific determination of the issues of fact and 
a separate determination of the law. The cases abon 
cited hold that a judgment enterr'd without this dl'termi-
nation is a nullity and must be rncated. 
Parties to a lawsuit are entitled to a judicial deter-
mination of their eontron•rsy. Tl1e trial judge in this 
case has failed completely to perform this duty. There iR 
nothing in the record to indicate any judicial considera-
tion of the facts or the law. Appan'ntly the couclusiorn; 
of law and decision \\·ere simply pulled out of the drawer. 
There is no conflict in th0 evidence and there is no 
O"enuine issue with respect to auv material fact. In this b • 
posture of the case the trial court should be directed to 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of la\\· and judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
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SUMMARY 
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, as applied to 
plaintiff's property, confiscates it and violates rights 
guaranteed by both the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Apart from constitutional considerations, the resolution 
is an abuse of the zoning power conferred upon the Board 
of County Commissioners by the statutes of this state. 
It does not promote the public welfare but is detrimental 
thereto. It blockades the commercial dewlopment of the 
area aml interferes with interstate commerce. The freez-
ing of plaintiff's property to grazing use is a departure 
from the plan adopted by the Board for the physical 
development of the area so as to promote the public 
welfarr. It was enacted to prevent competition and 
create monopoly. It is unreasonable, discriminatory and 
YO id. 
'rhere has been no judicial determination of the con-
tronn.;y between the parties and the judgment is a nul-
lity aud must he vacated. The case should be remanded 
with directions to make and enter findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and judgment as prayed for in the plain-
tiff's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
By: GRANT H. BAGLEY 
LEONARD J. LEWIS 
Attorneys for AppeUan-t 
